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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal is from the Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Declaratory Judgment granting Summary Judgment for the 
Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has 
jurisdiction to hear this Appeal under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)(i) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)e(iii). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Director of State Lands upheld an audit and demand for 
payment issued by the Division of State Lands. The Plaintiff 
filed a Declaratory Judgment action challenging the Director's 
decision. The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and entered a Judgment reversing the decision of the 
Director. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows: 
(1) Whether the trial court erred in entering Summary 
Judgment authorizing depletion of the trust asset for less than 
full value in view of Federal and State constitutional law 
governing school trust lands? 
(2) Whether the plain language of the lease may be 
rewritten by the court because one party claims it is ambiguous? 
(3) Whether Plaintiff should be barred from using the 
doctrine of estoppel to avoid paying monies owed to the school 
trust fund when it was Plaintiff's duty to report and pay the 
correct amount of royalties? 
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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Enabling Act, §6: 
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, 
sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-
six in every township of said proposed state, and where 
such sections, or any parts thereof have been sold or 
otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any 
Act of Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in 
legal subdivisions of not less than one quarter section 
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of 
which the same is taken, are hereby granted to said 
State for the support of common schools.... 
Utah Enabling Act §10: 
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for 
educational purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise 
provided, shall constitute a permanent school fund, the 
interest of which only shall be expended for the 
support of said schools, and such land shall not be 
subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any other 
entry under the land laws of the United States, whether 
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for 
school purposes only. 
Utah Constitution, Article X, §5: 
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of 
Congress, approved February 21st, 1855, for the 
establishment of the University of Utah, and of all the 
lands granted by an Act of Congress, approved July 
16th, 1894, shall constitute permanent funds, to be 
safely invested and held by the State; and the income 
thereof shall be used exclusively for the support and 
maintenance of the different institutions and colleges, 
respectively, in accordance with the requirements and 
conditions of said Acts of Congress. 91 (Article X was 
amended, effective July 1, 1987 with Section 5 becoming 
Sections 5 and 7). 
Utah Constitution, Article XX, §1: 
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter 
be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands 
acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or 
corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are 
hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of 
the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, 
2 
to be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the 
respective purposes for which they have been or may be 
granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired. 
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-23: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land 
Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form 
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental, 
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the 
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it 
may deem necessary in the interest of the state. 
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-76: 
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by 
the State Land Board shall before execution by such 
board be approved as to form by the attorney general. 
30 U.S.C. §207(a): 
[A] lease shall require payment of a royalty in such 
amount as the Secretary shall determine of not less 
than 12 1/2 per centum of the value of coal as defined 
by regulation, except the Secretary may determine a 
lesser amount in the case of coal recovered by 
underground mining operations.... 
43 C.F.R. §3473.3-2: 
2. A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not 
less than 12 1/2% of the value of the coal removed from 
a surface mine. 
3. A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not 
less than 8% of the value of the coal removed from an 
underground mine, except that the (Minerals Management 
Service) may determine a lesser amount, but in no case 
less than 5% if conditions warrant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Utah Division of State Lands audited the payments under 
its coal leases on school trust lands. One of those leases was 
held by Plaintiff, Blackhawk Coal Company. Demand was made to 
Plaintiff to pay royalties found by the audit to have been 
3 
underpaid. Plaintiff appealed the decision of the auditors tc 
the Director of the Division of State Lands. The Director, after 
a hearing, upheld the audit and the demand for payment. (R.433) 
Plaintiff then filed this action in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court asking for a declaration that the State could not collect 
the unpaid royalties. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment finding that Plaintiff owed nothing to 
the State. (Addenda 1 and 2) It is from those Orders that this 
appeal is taken. 
The United States, pursuant to the Utah Enabling Act, 
granted lands to the State of Utah to be used for the support of 
the common schools. The State holds the land as trustee. 
Management of those lands is by the Board of State Lands and the 
Division of State Lands. Utah Code Ann. §65-1-14. 
On February 16, 19 60 the State issued to Carbon Development 
Company coal lease no. 18148. (Addendum 3) The lease authorizes 
extraction of coal from school trust lands located in Carbon 
County, Utah. The lease is perpetual, as long as coal is 
produced in commercial quantities, with a provision for 
adjustment at the end of each 20-year period. The lease was 
assigned to the Plaintiff. 
The United States Government owns most of the coal-producing 
lands within the State of Utah; therefore, the royalty charged 
on federal coal leases generally becomes the prevailing market 
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royalty rate for coal leases within the State. When State lease 
no. 18148 was issued by the State, the royalty rate on many 
federal coal leases was $.15 per ton. The paragraph (Article III 
Second) requiring the payment of royalty on the subject State 
lease requires Lessees: 
To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day 
of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty 
(a) at the rate of $.15 per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal 
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise 
disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the 
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal 
lessees of land of similar character under coal leases 
issued by the United State at that time, 
whichever is higher.... 
State lease no. 18148 also requires the Plaintiff to prepare 
and forward to the State, each quarter, a certified statement as 
to the amount of production together with other information as 
required by the State Land Board. (Article III, Third) The 
State also retained the right to go upon the premises and conduct 
audits of the lessees' records. (Article XI) 
The federal coal lease royalty rate generally remained at 
$.15 per ton until August 4, 1976. On August 4, 1976 the Federal 
Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, 30 U.S.C. §§201-209 was 
enacted by Congress. The Act and the regulations promulgated 
thereunder, increased the royalty rate on surface mines to 12 
1/2% of the value of the coal produced and the royalty rate on 
underground mines to 8% of the value of the coal produced. 
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Between January 1, 1979 and the audit, twenty-four (24) coa 
leases were issued by the United States Bureau of Land Managemenl 
on lands within the State of Utah. (R.315, 415, 441) Nineteer 
(19) of those leases required a royalty payment of 8% of the 
value of coal. (R.315, 415, 441) Only one required a royalty 
rate of less than 8% and that royalty rate was 5% of the value of 
the coal. The adjoining States of Colorado, Wyoming and New 
Mexico have all increased their royalty rate to at least 8% of 
gross sales value of the coal extracted. (R.423, 425, 431) 
Plaintiff was fully aware of the Federal Coal Leasing 
Amendments Act and the increase in the federal royalty rate. 
Plaintiff had this knowledge from the leasing of federal lands 
and litigation involving the increased royalty rate on federal 
coal leases held by Plaintiff. (R.397, 399) See also Blackhawk 
Coal Company IBLA 82-519. Plaintiff also holds 11 federal leases 
in the Price River Complex where state lease no. 18148 is 
located. Four of those leases have a royalty rate of $.12.5 per 
ton. Those leases were issued in the 1930's and 1950's. Six of 
the leases have a royalty of 8% and one has a royalty of 10.4%. 
Those leases were either issued or adjusted after passage of the 
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976. (R.396) 
In 1981 the State of Utah notified Plaintiff that the State 
intended to adjust state lease no. 18148. The adjustments 
included an increase in the royalty rate. Plaintiff objected and 
argued that the request for readjustment was not timely. (R.280) 
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The Land Board, after a hearing, upheld the adjustments but 
delayed enforcement of the adjustment until the Attorney 
General's office decided whether the request for adjustment was 
timely, (R.280) This question was being litigated in the federal 
courts, Rosebud Coal Sales Company vs. Andrus, 667 F.2d 949 
(1982), therefore the Attorney General's office deferred issuing 
an opinion until the federal courts settled the question. In 
1983 Plaintiff ceased production so the adjustment was not 
pursued by the State. The royalties sought to be collected 
accrued prior to the last quarter of 1983. (R.303) 
The lands that the Division of State Lands manages have 
thousands of mineral leases. The Division does not have the 
funds or the personnel to monitor each lease or the payments 
received on those leases. (R.433) Instead the State of Utah, as 
written in its lease provisions and regulations, requires its 
lessees to accurately provide information and to pay the correct 
amounts of royalties. (Addendum 3) Like reporting taxes, it has 
largely been an honor reporting system. In 1981 the Utah State 
Legislature appropriated funds for the Division of State Lands to 
hire an auditor to review income from its mineral leases. (R.412, 
433) Richard Mitchell was hired. (R.412) He set up an auditing 
procedure and started to audit the State's oil and gas leases. 
(R.412) In 1984 the Auditing Division was expanded and two 
auditors, Douglas E. Johnson and Ralph Aiello, were hired. 
(R.415, 427) 
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In December of 1984 the auditors started to review the Stat* 
coal leases. The audit included an analysis of the U.S. Bureai 
of Land Management records on federal coal leases and ar 
examination of the Plaintiff's and other State coal lessee 
records. The auditors found that the coal lessees had, in 
certain instances, under reported production and failed to report 
other vital information. They also found that the royalty rate 
on federal coal leases had increased to 8% beginning in 1977 but 
the Plaintiff had failed to report and pay royalties at the 
prevailing federal rate. (R.415, 4272) 
An audit report was prepared and submitted to the Division 
of State Lands. (R.303, 415, 427) The Director of the Division 
of State Lands established an audit committee to review the 
auditors7 report. The committee reviewed the lease and the 
findings of the report. Some adjustments were made to the report 
and it was approved. (R.415, 433) The report was then sent to 
the Plaintiff with a request for payment of the delinquent 
royalties together with interest. 
The Plaintiff, upon receipt of the audit report, requested a 
hearing before the Director of the Division of State Lands. A 
hearing was held. The Director rejected the appeal and upheld 
the findings of the auditors. (R.433) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal is from the trial court's grant of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Summary Judgment is appropriate only when the 
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pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and admissions on file, 
together with affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). This Court 
should consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
Defendants, Durham vs. Margetts, 571 P. 2d 1332 at 1334 (Utah 
1977), and affirm the decision only if the Court determines there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact and that 
the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Briggs 
vs. Holcombe, 740 P.2d 281 at 283 (Utah 1987). This Court, in 
reviewing the issues of law, gives no deference to the trial 
court. Atlas Corporation vs. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225 
at 229 (Utah 1987) . 
The issues before the Court have been decided against 
Plaintiff by the Director of State Lands. The Court, when 
reviewing the decision of the Director, should not override the 
Director's interpretation of the Division's rules, policies and 
regulations unless his decision is arbitrary or erroneous. This 
Court should only inquire as to whether the Director acted in 
excess of his powers in upholding the audit. McKnight vs. State 
Land Board, 381 P.2d 726 at 731 (Utah 1963), Atlantic Richfield 
Company vs. Hinkel, 432 F.2d 587 at 591 (10th Cir. 1970). 
The Defendants agree that the controlling issues in the case 
are issues of law. The Defendants maintain that when the issues 
of law are correctly decided they are entitled to judgment as a 
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matter of law. Defendants maintain, however, that there are 
issues of fact in dispute which preclude entry of summary 
judgment for the Plaintiff. Defendants request that this Court 
review the legal issues, that those issues be decided in favor of 
Defendants, and that the case be remanded with instructions to 
enter judgment in favor of the Defendants. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The State of Utah, as a condition of statehood, 
acquired certain lands in trust for the benefit of the common 
schools. The State has a Constitutional and moral duty to obtain 
full value from the disposition of those lands. The trial court 
placed impermissible restrictions on the trust lands in question 
when it restricted the royalty rate the State could collect from 
those lands to $.15 per ton rather than allowing the State to 
collect the contractually required market rate of 8% of value of 
the coal. 
2. The royalty provision in the coal lease is clear and 
should be given its plain meaning. The requirement that the 
Plaintiff periodically determine whether the federal royalty rate 
has changed and that it pay royalties on the changed rate does 
not create an ambiguity. Such provisions are common in 
long-term leases to insure that the parties pay according to 
prevailing market terms. In this case, a fluctuating royalty 
rate is constitutionally required to insure that the trust fund 
receives full value for its lands. 
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3. The Court should use rules of construction to clarify 
any ambiguity in the lease. The trial court erred when it 
rewrote the parties' lease by limiting royalties to $.15 per ton. 
Not even the Plaintiff claims that the royalty rate should always 
remain at $.15 per ton. The lease should be construed to give 
meaning to all its provisions including subparagraph (b) of the 
royalty provision which provides for increases in the royalty 
rate. 
4. Estoppel should not be used by the Court to prevent the 
trust fund from receiving full value for its assets. The Utah 
Enabling Act requires the trust to receive full value and 
requires the State to manage the trust fund in its governmental 
capacity. To allow estoppel in this case would violate those 
constitutional requirements and would cost the trust fund in 
excess of three million dollars. 
5. The Plaintiff has suffered no injury, was aware of the 
facts which caused the royalty rate to increase, and had the duty 
to pay the correct royalties. The State is only asking that the 
Plaintiff pay what is required by the lease. Such a request 
should not be estopped. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
THE TRUST ASSETS OF THE STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS MAY 
NOT BE DEPLETED FOR LESS THAN FULL VALUE. 
The State lands which are subject to the coal lease in 
question are school trust lands. The interpretation of the lease 
and the other issues that were before the trial court were 
subject to rules of law established by the Utah Enabling Act, 
Constitutional provisions and case law. The trial court 
erroneously rejected the law governing school trust lands in its 
construction of the lease and in its holding that the State was 
estopped from obtaining fair market value for its trust lands. 
This argument will first set forth a brief historical background 
on the purpose and policy of trust lands and will then examine 
the case law which the trial court should have applied in 
deciding this case. 
A
« The Historical Background Provides Essential 
Perspective. 
Utah is one of thirty (30) public land states whose Enabling 
Act granted lands to be used for the support of schools and 
institutions. L. Mall, Public Land and Mining Law, 44-47 [3 Ed. 
1981]. In Utah vs. Kleepe, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978) rev'd 
on other grounds 446 U.S. 500 (1980) the Court explained the 
purpose of the school land grants: 
There were no federal lands within the borders of the 
original thirteen states when they adopted and ratified 
the United States Constitution. Thus, virtually all of 
the lands within their borders were subject to 
taxation, including taxation necessary for the 
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maintenance of their public school systems. When other 
states were subsequently admitted into the Union, their 
territorial confines were "carved" from federal 
territories. The "public lands" owned and reserved by 
the United States within those territorial confines 
were not subject to taxation. This reservation by the 
United States created serious impediment to the "public 
land" states in relation to an adequate property tax 
base necessary to permit these states to operate and 
maintain essential government services, including the 
public school systems. It was in recognition thereof, 
i.e., in order to "equalize" the status of the newly 
admitted states with that of the original thirteen 
states, that the Congress enacted the federal land 
grant statutes. The specific purpose was to create a 
binding permanent trust which would generate financial 
aid to support the public school systems of the "public 
land" states. 
Id. at 758. 
The Utah Enabling Act granted four (4) sections of land in 
each township for the support of the common schools. Utah 
Enabling Act §6. The State of Utah, in its Constitution, 
accepted those lands in trust for the respective purposes for 
which they had been granted. Constitution of Utah, Article XX. 
B. The Law Requires The Receipt Of Full Value From 
The Disposition Of Trust Lands. 
The school land grants constitute a solemn agreement between 
the United States and the State of Utah. There has been imposed 
upon the State of Utah: 
[a] binding and perpetual obligation to use the granted 
lands for the support of public education. All revenue 
from the sale or lease of the school grants was 
impressed with a trust in favor of the public schools. 
No State could divert school lands to other public 
purposes without compensating the trust for the full 
market value of the interest taken. 
Andrus vs. Utah. 446 U.S. 500 at 523-524, 64 L.Ed.2d 458 at 474, 
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100 Sup. Ct. 1803 (1981). 
Beginning with the case of Trustees of Vincennes University 
vs. State of Indiana, 55 U.S. 268 at 274 (1852) the Supreme Court 
of the United States has consistently held that a State holds 
school lands in trust for the benefit of its schools. Congress 
and the Courts have placed restrictions on the use of the trust 
lands so that they are not exploited for private advantage or 
depleted by State action or inaction. Lassen vs. Arizona, 385 
U.S. 458, 87 S.Ct. 584, 17 L.Ed.2d 515 at 522 (1967). (While 
Lassen dealt with surface rights, recent cases make it clear that 
these restrictions also apply to mineral interests located in 
school trust lands. Jensen vs. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32 at 35 (Utah 
1982), Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 
96 S.Ct. 910, 47 L.Ed.2d 1 at 8 (1976). 
The duty of the State, in managing mineral rights on trust 
lands, is to obtain full value for the trust assets: 
The royalty rate set by the state is important because 
it represents payment for a trust asset which will be 
gone forever once the mineral is removed from the 
ground. Therefore, the requirements of the Enabling 
Act and the trust concept are the most important 
factors to consider in determining an optimum royalty 
rate. If the rate is too low the state will be 
committing a breach of trust by diminishing the trust. 
Royalty payments are placed in a permanent trust fund, 
the corpus of which is invested; the trust is kept 
whole if fair market value is received. If the royalty 
rate is too low the trust will not be kept whole. 
3 State School Trust Lands and Oil and Gas Royalty Rates. Public 
Land Law Review, 119, 130 (1982). See also Kadish vs. Arizona 
State Land Department, 747 P.2d 1183 at 1195 (Ariz. 1987). State 
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vs. Kleepe, supra at 758; State vs. University of Alaska, 624 
P.2d 807 at 813 (Alaska 1981). 
To enforce this important trust purpose, the Courts have 
consistently rejected any State statutes, constitutional 
provisions and Court-imposed doctrines which restrict the State 
from obtaining full value from the trust lands. In Kadish vs. 
Arizona State Land Department, supra, the Supreme Court of 
Arizona held unconstitutional an Arizona statute that fixed a 
flat royalty rate for mineral leases on state school trust lands. 
The court noted that federal law is supreme in this field and 
that: 
[n]either this court, nor the legislature, nor the 
people may alter or amend the trust provisions 
contained in the Enabling Act without congressional 
approval. 
Id. at 1185. The court said that the Enabling Act intended to 
severely circumscribe the power of state government to deal with 
the assets of the common school fund. It analyzed the court 
cases dealing with this subject and pointed out that: 
[t]he courts have consistently construed the scope of 
federal land grants in favor of the government. In 
dealing with trust land ... all doubts must be resolved 
in favor of protecting and preserving trust purposes. 
Id. at 1195. 
The primary case discussing the Utah Enabling Act is State 
of Utah vs. Kleepe, supra. That case dealt with the State's "in 
lieu" selections of additional lands to replace lands the State 
had not received pursuant to the Enabling Act. The Court, after 
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reviewing the Utah Enabling Act and the historical development ol 
trust lands, stated: 
The school land grant and its acceptance by the state 
constitutes a solemn compact between the United States 
and the state for the benefit of the state's public 
school system. 
Id. at 758. 
Recent cases from other jurisdictions have consistently 
rejected attempts to limit the income received by the school 
trust. In Anderson vs. Board of Education, 256 N.W.2d 318 (Neb. 
1977) the Nebraska Supreme Court approved the resale of school 
trust property after a higher upset bid was received after the 
first sale. It stated that the constitution: 
imposes on the Board the duty of obtaining the highest 
price possible for all trust property it may sell. 
Id. at 321. 
In Oklahoma Education Association vs. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 
(Ok. 1981) the Supreme Court of Oklahoma struck down a law 
authorizing low-interest loans to farmers from the funds of the 
school trust fund. In doing so the court said: 
No disposition of such lands or funds can be made that 
conflict either with the terms and purposes of the 
grant in the Enabling Act or the provisions of the 
Constitution relating to such land and funds. The 
State has an irrevocable duty, as Trustee, to manage 
the trust estate for the exclusive benefit of the 
beneficiaries, and return full value from the use and 
disposition of the trust property. 
Id. at 235. 
In County of Skamania vs. Washington, 685 P.2d 576 at 582 
(Wash. 1984) a state statute which allowed purchasers of timber 
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from trust lands to default so as to avoid insolvency on the part 
of timber purchases was held unconstitutional. 
In Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 
at 3 05 (1976), the federal government condemned school trust 
lands including sections leased as grazing lands. Commenting on 
the validity of a school trust leasehold made for less than fair 
value, the court considered a protective provision contained in 
the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act which provided against the 
initial selling of lease rentals at less than fair value. The 
United States Supreme Court held that if the lease of trust lands 
was for a rental of substantially less than the land's then fair 
value, the lease was void. 
The Courts consistently hold that entities, such as the 
Plaintiff, are charged with knowledge of the trust and are also 
subject to the duty to obtain full value for the trust. State 
vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193 at 1199 (Ok. 1953), 
State vs. Lamacus, 263 P.2d 426 at 427 (Ok. 1953), Seidel vs. 
Seward, 133 NW.2d 390 at 391 (Neb. 1965), State vs. Board of 
Educational Lands and Funds of Nebraska, 65 NW.2d 392 at 397 
(Neb. 1954) and Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 
948 at 957 (Mont. 1985). 
C Trust Land Law And Policy Should Be Applied To The 
Facts Of This Case. 
The State of Utah has the duty to receive full market value 
from the disposition of its school trust lands. The market 
royalty rate on coal leases in the State of Utah is controlled 
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by the United States which has the vast majority of coa 
reserves. Lessees require long-term leases because of th« 
capital expenditures involved. It would have been ar 
impermissible restriction on the trust assets if the State would 
have set a flat $.15 per ton royalty on its long term coal 
leases. Kadish vs. Arizona State Land Department, supra at 1195. 
It is equally impermissible for the court to judicially set the 
royalty rate at a flat $.15 per ton. The State therefore, 
drafted an escalator clause in its coal lease which tied the 
royalty provision to the prevailing federal rate. That escalator 
clause insured that the State would, throughout the term of the 
lease, receive full market value. 
The State also implemented rules and regulations which 
provide for interest and penalties on delinquent royalty 
payments. Those provisions further insure that the trust 
receives full market value; otherwise, the trust would be 
depleted as a result of the time value of money. Biork vs. April 
Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315 at 317 (Utah 1977). 
The Plaintiff, as a party dealing with the trust and 
pursuant to the terms of the lease, had the duty to pay the 
correct amount of royalty. When an audit was performed by the 
State it showed that the Plaintiff owed to the trust fund in 
excess of three million dollars. (R.303) The trial court, by 
refusing to enforce the escalator provision of the lease, by 
refusing to require the payment of interest on delinquent 
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royalties, and by amending the lease to limit royalties to $.15 
per ton imposed constitutionally impermissible restrictions on 
the trust fund. That decision, in this case, costs the trust 
fund, as of the audit, more than three million dollars with an 
ongoing loss of more than $2.00 per ton for coal produced after 
the audit. The contract created by the trial court runs directly 
counter to the law and public policy of this State. Thus, the 
court below is in the anomalous position of having written a 
contract which violates "the generally accepted doctrine of this 
country that every contract in violation of law is void.11 Baker 
vs. Latses, 60 Utah 38 at 44, 206 P.2d 533 at 555 (1922). See 
also. Haddock vs. Salt Lake City, 23 Utah 52, 65 P. 491 (1901) 
(holding void as against public policy a contract to pay fees for 
service of legal processes where the fees set in the contract 
were different from the fees set by statute) ; Boise-Payette 
Lumber Company vs. Challis Independent School District, No. 1 of 
Custer County, 46 Idaho 403, 268 P. 26 (1928) (holding that 
judicial determinations of public policy must recognize and yield 
to any applicable legislative enactments). 
The instant case should be reversed and remanded to the 
trial court with instructions that the escalator clause be 
enforced and that the trust fund receive royalty rates at the 
prevailing market rate of 8% of the value of the coal removed 
together with interest as provided by the regulations. 
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POINT II. THE ESCALATION CLAUSE RELATING TO ROYALTIES 
IS CLEAR; THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE PLAINTIFF DETERMINE 
THE PREVAILING FEDERAL ROYALTY RATE DOES NOT MAKE THE 
CLAUSE AMBIGUOUS. 
The Court, as a matter of law, is to give the provisions of 
a contract their plain meaning as ascertained from the instrument 
itself. The Court should look to the entire instrument and give 
meaning to all provisions. Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 P.2d 
1060 at 1061 (Utah 1981), Hal Taylor Associates vs. Union 
America, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 at 749 (Utah 1982). The trial court 
erred when it ignored the plain meaning of the royalty provision 
and the intent of the parties when entering into the contract and 
rewrote the lease deleting the escalator provision of the royalty 
clause. 
A reading of the royalty provision in the lease (Article III 
Second) shows that it is clear and complies with the intent of 
the parties that the trust lands receive the going royalty rate. 
It states that the royalty rate will be $.15 per ton (which was 
the federal rate when the lease was signed) or if the prevailing 
federal rate increases on similar lands then the royalty rate 
increases to that new rate. The trial court was apparently under 
the misconception that because the escalator clause required the 
Plaintiff to determine the prevailing rate from facts outside the 
lease that somehow an ambiguity was created. Such a provision is 
not defective if there is a formula or method to set the price. 
Ferris vs. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 at 359 (Utah 1979). 
Escalator clauses in long-term mineral leases are common 
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provisions. Almost all escalator clauses or "favored nation" 
clauses require the parties to ascertain a fluctuating rate from 
facts outside the body of the lease. See e.g. Energy Reserves 
Group, Inc., vs. Kansas Power and Light Company, 459 U.S. 400 at 
417 (1983), Amoco Production Company vs. Stauffer Chemical 
Company of Wyoming. 612 P.2d 463 at 468 (Wyo. 1980), Lonestar Gas 
Company vs. The Howard Corporation, 556 S.W.2d 372 at 376 (Tx. 
1977). The ascertaining of facts outside the lease, to put into 
effect the lease provisions, does not create an ambiguity. 
Instead, such provisions are drafted to insure that rates, such 
as royalty rates, are tied to the market price thereby protecting 
both parties during the term of the lease. 
The royalty provision contained in the contract provides a 
formula for fixing the payment price. Subsection (b) of the 
provision states that the royalty payment to be paid by the 
Plaintiff is determined by the prevailing federal rate on lands 
of similar character under coal leases issued by the federal 
government. Plaintiff had the duty to determine any change in 
the federal royalty rate. The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments 
Act of 1976 increased the royalty rate to 8% of the value of the 
coal produced on federal coal leases. The federal government 
owns the majority of coal reserves in Utah. Since 1979, 19 of 24 
coal leases issued by the federal government in the State require 
a royalty payment of 8% of value. In addition, the adjoining 
states of Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico have increased the 
21 
royalty rate to at least 8% of the value of coal produced under 
their leases. Plaintiff, in its Price River Complex, had sevei 
federal leases which had been issued or adjusted since 1980. Si> 
of those leases had an 8% royalty and one had a 10.4% royalty. 
Those facts when applied to the royalty provision require that a 
royalty rate of 8% of value be paid to the trust fund. 
The plain meaning of the provision is that the royalty rate 
to be paid by the Plaintiff would change when the federal royalty 
rate increased. The Plaintiff does not argue that $.15 is the 
prevailing federal rate for federal leases of land of similar 
character and concede that the federal rate is higher than the 
royalty payment they paid prior to 1976. Plaintiff, to avoid 
paying the correct royalty, instead tries to claim the lease is 
ambiguous. A reading of the plain language of the lease, coupled 
with the law governing trust lands, and the change in federal 
royalty rates support only one construction of the lease. That 
construction is that the prevailing federal rate on underground 
coal leases has increased to 8% of value and that Plaintiff must 
pay royalties at that rate to provide full value to the trust. 
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POINT III. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED THE LAW 
REGARDING TRUST LANDS, THE ESCALATOR PROVISIONS OF THE 
LEASE, AND THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AND IMPOSED A 
FLAT $,15 PER TON ROYALTY RATE. 
A. Any Ambiguous Provision Should Be Resolved By 
Rules Of Construction Instead Of Being Deleted From The 
Lease. 
If the Court determines there is an ambiguity in the lease 
then the Court should apply certain rules of construction to 
interpret or clarify the ambiguous provision. The Court should 
not delete or rewrite the contract. Those rules of construction 
are: (1) the intent of the parties when entering into the 
contract controls the meaning of the contract, Utah Valley Bank 
vs. Tannerf supra at 1061; (2) existing law which affects the 
provision is considered part of the contract and governs its 
construction, Robinson vs. Joint School District, 596 P.2d 436 at 
438 (Ida. 1979), Farmers Investment Company vs. Pima Mining 
Company, 523 P.2d 487 at 489 (Az. 1974); (3) consideration should 
be given to the subject matter, nature and purpose of the 
contract and the motives of the parties, Nagle vs. Club 
Fontainbleu. 405 P.2d 346 at 348 (Utah 1965); (4) the contract 
should be viewed from the perspective of the parties at the time 
it was signed, DeBouis vs. Nigh, 584 P.2d 823 at 824 (Utah 1978); 
(5) the court should give the entire contract meaning and not 
ignore any of the provisions of the contract or rewrite the 
contract, Hal Taylor Associates vs. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743 at 749 (Utah 1982) ; and (6) the contract must be construed 
liberally to protect the public interest, Public Service Company 
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vs. Denver, 387 P.2d 33 at 36 (Colo. 1963), Restatement o 
Contracts 2d §207. 
If these rules of construction are applied to the royalt} 
provision, the interpretation given by the State is the correct 
and reasonable one. The State, as trustee, is required to have a 
royalty provision which provides a maximum value to the trust 
fund. A royalty rate that would fluctuate as market conditions 
changed is required. To have set a flat royalty rate would have 
been unconstitutional. Kadish vs. Arizona State Land Department, 
supra at 1195. The Federal Government owns the majority of coal 
reserves in the State of Utah; therefore, the royalty rate 
charged by the Federal Government constitutes the prevailing 
market rate in the State of Utah. At the time the lease 
provision was drafted the federal royalty rate was generally $.15 
per ton. The royalty provision, therefore, was drafted setting a 
minimum royalty of $.15 per ton, but providing an escalator 
clause tied to the prevailing federal royalty rate. The 
escalator clause was required by law and the obvious intent of 
the parties when the contract was entered into was to provide a 
mechanism whereby the State would always receive the going market 
royalty rate from its trust lands. When one ties that 
information and construction to the undisputed facts it shows 
that the federal royalty rate remained at $.15 per ton until 
1976. At that time the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act was 
passed and as a result the royalty rate on federal leases was 
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increased to 8%. The undisputed facts show that from 1979 to the 
present all newly issued federal leases in Utah, except for one, 
were at the rate of 8% or greater. The Director of State Lands 
properly construed the lease to require payment of royalties at 
8%. 
B. The Plaintiff Has Never Contended That The Royalty 
Should Always Remain At $,15 Per Ton. 
One of the things that is certain about the royalty 
provision, in addition to the plain meaning of Subsection b, is 
that the contracting parties intended that the royalty rate would 
change if federal royalty rates increased. Plaintiff argues that 
the Court should look at past practices of the parties to 
determine the meaning of the royalty provision. The past 
practices of the parties are of no benefit at all in construing 
the meaning of the paragraphs involved in this case. The past 
practice of the parties, paying the rate specified under 
Subparagraph a, has nothing to do with Subparagraph b which 
surely must also be given effect. The contract must be construed 
to give effect to both provisions. Hal Taylor Associates vs. 
Union America, Inc., supra at 749. The obvious problem with 
Plaintiff's claim for interpretation of the royalty provision is 
that it ignores Subparagraph b. That is not interpretation, that 
is selective blindness. 
Plaintiff does not argue that $.15 is the prevailing federal 
rate for federal leases on land of similar character under coal 
leases issued by the United States during the time period covered 
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by the audit. Its silence concedes that the rate is something 
higher than $.15. However, because Plaintiff does not like the 
higher rate, Plaintiff claims ambiguity and that it should be 
allowed to continue to pay at $.15 per ton as provided under 
Subparagraph a. This has nothing to do with the intent of either 
party at the time of the execution of the lease. Indeed, that 
so-called interpretation flatly contradicts the parties7 intent 
at the time it was signed. In this particular case the 
undisputed facts establish that the prevailing federal rate is 8% 
of value which is the rate Plaintiff pays to the federal 
government on most of its other leases. Any changes in the rate 
can be easily determined by review of Bureau of Land Management 
records. 
C. State Statutes Prohibit The Amending Of The Lease 
Without The Land Board's Approval. 
There is a difference between construing a provision and 
ignoring it. To ignore and not enforce Subparagraph b of the 
royalty provision of the lease constitutes a rewriting of the 
terms of the lease without the necessary approval of the 
Director, the Land Board or the Attorney General. Morgan vs. 
Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 at 697 (Utah 1976). Utah Code 
Ann. §65-1-76 requires: 
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by 
the State Land Board shall before execution by such 
board be approved as to form by the attorney general. 
§65-1-23 Utah Code Ann., requires: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land 
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Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form 
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental, 
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the 
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it 
may deem necessary in the interest of the state. 
The trial court; should \\< L be allowed to unilaterally 
rewrite the parties' lease. If there is an ambiguity, the trial 
court should be directed to apply proper rules of construction to 
clarify the ambiguity and give meaning to all of the royalty 
provisions. 
POINT IV. ESTOPPEL IS NOT AVAILABLE IN THIS CASE. 
The traditional rule is that the doctrine of estoppel cannot 
be asserted against a state government in matters affecting 
public policy, public revenues or when the state is acting in its 
governmental capacity. Estoppel is not applied in matters where 
an action is prohibited by a state statute or is the result of 
unauthorized acts of State officials. Atlantic Richfield Company 
vs. Hinkel, 432 F.2d 587 at 591 (10th Cir. 1970). 
There are many good reasons for this rule including 
safeguarding public funds and interests which are subject to 
changes in political opinions and changes in public officials and 
employees. Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d 
715 at 718 (Utah 1982). Restrictions on the application of legal 
doctrines when public lands are involved is common such as in the 
area of eminent domain, Utah Code Ann. §78-34-3 or adverse 
possession. There are even greater restrictions and protections 
when trust funds and trust lands are involved because of the 
constitutional requirements and important policies. 
The trial court's ruling that the State was estopped from 
enforcing the royalty provisions of the lease was wrong for the 
following reasons: (a) the important policies and law governing 
trust lands prohibits the use of estoppel when the doctrine is 
used to diminish the income received by the trust fund; (b) the 
State acts in its governmental capacity when managing trust lands 
and is subject to estoppel in only limited circumstances; and (c) 
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the undisputed facts wii 1 no! support a finding of estoppel. 
A. The Important Policy Of Receiving Full Value For 
The Trust Fund Prohibits The Use Of Estoppel. 
The trial court erred when it concluded that Defendants were 
estopped as a matter of law from enforcing the terms of the lease 
and obtaining full value for the trust fund. Courts which have 
considered whether estoppel should be applied when it would 
reduce the income t o school trust lands have consistently held 
that the important public policy of providing full value to the 
trust lands prohibits the imposition of a defense such as 
estoppel. 
In State vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193 (Ok. 
1953) the clerk for the State failed to reserve minerals when 
issuing a certificate of purchase for land. The Court, in 
allowing reformation of the documents restoring the mineral 
rights to the State, held that the State was acting in a 
governmental capacity and that it would be a violation of the 
State's trust responsibilities to allow divestiture of the 
mineral rights. Furthermore, the court said that the purchaser 
is charged with notice that the State is acting as a trustee and 
is charged with notice that the State could only act in 
compliance with rules and regulations of its position as trustee. 
The Court held that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to 
those acts which were beyond the authority of the State employee 
when he issued the deed and failed tc reserve the mineral rights. 
.Id. at 1199. The State employee in this case had no authority, 
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either intentionally or accidentally, to set a royalty rate lowei 
than the prevailing federal rate. 
In State vs. Northwest Maanesite Company, 182 P.2d 643 
(Wash. 1947) the Commissioner of public lands promised the lessee 
of school trust lands that the lessee could remit royalties on 
the basis of net profits. That representation was contrary to 
the statute and the lease. The Court, in holding that the lessee 
was required to pay royalties in accordance with the terms of the 
lease, held that the State was acting in a governmental capacity, 
that estoppel could not be used to enforce the promise of the 
Commissioner of Public Lands, that Defendants payment of money 
did not constitute an estoppel, and that the State was entitled 
to interest on the unpaid royalties. Id. at 662. 
In the case of Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702 
P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985), Defendants claimed that they were entitled 
to certain water rights. The Montana Supreme Court denied 
Defendants7 claim and found that the water rights were part of 
of the school trust lands of the State of Montana. The Court 
held that there were three important principals governing school 
trust lands. Those principals were: (1) the Enabling Act created 
a trust which the State could not violate; (2) the Enabling Act 
was to be strictly construed according to fiduciary principles; 
and (3) the Enabling Act pre-empted State laws and constitutions. 
It further held that Courts are to be very protective of the 
trust and emphatic of the need to preserve the value of the trust 
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corpus, Ttie court" also found that an interest in State land 
cannot be conveyed without adequate compensation and that, any use 
or management which would devalue State lands is impermissible. 
It said that anyone who acquires an interest in trust lands does 
so subject to the trust and that trust lands are subject to a 
different set of rules than other public lands. Id. at 956. 
The holdings in the above cases are consistent with the 
manner in which this Court has decided issues involving estoppel 
against the State. The general rule in Utah is that an estoppel 
cannot be applied against the State if to do so would violate 
State statute. Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, 
supra at 719. In the case at hand, the application of an 
estoppel would be a violation of both State statutes and the 
Constitution of Utah. Even if the Court determines that estoppel 
could apply, the Plaintiff must prove that estoppel is necessary 
to prevent manifest injustice and the public interest would not 
be unduly damaged by imposing the defense. Utah State University 
vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d 715 at 718 (Utah 1982), Celebrity 
Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 at 
694 (Utah 19 / •») . In Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company 
the Court stated: 
[t]he rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel 
against the government is sound and generally should be 
applied, except only in appropriate circumstances as 
hereinabove stated, where the interest of justice 
mandates an exception to the general rule. In cases 
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is 
whether it appears that the facts may be found with 
sufficient certainty, and the injustice to be suffered 
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is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception. 
Id. at 720. 
The essential policy and public interest in trust land cases 
is the requirement that the trust fund receive full value for its 
assets. To allow the application of estoppel in this case would 
defeat that purpose. As pointed out in Utah State University vs. 
Sutro and Company and Celebrity Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied 
when it would violate such an important public purpose. See 
also, Western Kane County Service District vs. Jackson Cattle 
Company, 744 P. 2d 1376 at 1378 (Utah 1987) (reversing a ruling 
based on estoppel and stating lf[w]e are extremely reluctant to 
apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in 
a public highway by a governmental entity"). 
In addition, there is no manifest injustice involved. An 
assertion of manifest injustice requires the Plaintiff to prove 
with certainty that paying royalties at $.15 per ton is a higher 
purpose than that of the trust fund receiving full value for its 
assets. Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, supra at 
718. The injustice in this case is the trial court's application 
of estoppel giving the Plaintiff a windfall at the expense of the 
school trust fund. 
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B. Estoppel Is Applicable Only In Very Limited 
Circumstances When The State Is Acting In Its 
Governmental Capacity, 
The question of whether the State of Utah acted in its 
governmental proprietary capacity when managing school trust 
lands was considered by the Utah Supreme Court in Duchesne County 
vs. State Tax Commission, 140 P.2d 335 (Utah 1943). This Court 
held: 
Here the trusteeship of the fund was vested in the 
State by the Enabling Act as a condition of statehood, 
as a condition to the right of the State to be born, 
and imposed upon the State at its birth by the 
instrument of its creation as a condition of its life 
as a government. It must therefore be held by the 
state in a governmental capacity. 
Id. at 343. 
This ruling is in line with rulings in other states which 
have considered the issue as well as the present case law of the 
State of Utah regarding the distinction between proprietary 
functions and governmental functions as to which the State 
retains its immunity. A governmental function has been defined 
as a function which is performed only by a government entity and 
is essential to the core of governmental activity. Cox vs. Utah 
Land and Mortgage Corporation, 716 P.2d 783 at 785 (Utah 1986), 
Metropolitan Financial Company vs. State, 714 P.2d 293 at 294 
(Utah 1986). The Utah Legislature has recently expanded that 
definit ion to include non-essential as well as essential 
governmental activities. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a). The 
management of school trust lands is an obligation imposed upon 
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the State by a federal statute and accepted by the Utalr. 
Constitution. It is an activity that can only be performed by 
the State. 
As already established, the Court must be extremely 
reluctant to apply estoppel when the State is acting in its 
governmental capacity. When public lands are involved, still 
more restrictive rules govern. For example, adverse possession 
cannot be applied against public lands. Peterson vs. Johnson, 34 
P.2d 697 at 698 (Utah 1934). Great protection is given to trust 
lands because doctrines such as estoppel or adverse possession 
defeat constitutional requirements to receive full value for the 
trust and violate the State's governmental powers. Department of 
State Lands vs. Pettibone. supra at 952. 
It is hard to imagine any other act of the State which would 
be more governmental in nature than the trust responsibilities 
imposed by the Enabling Act and accepted by the State in its 
Constitution and as a requirement to obtain statehood. Estoppel 
cannot be used to prevent the State from functioning in this 
important government capacity. 
c
* The Undisputed Facts Do Not Support A Finding Of 
Estoppel. 
The trial court erred when it concluded that the State was 
estopped from collecting delinquent royalty payments. Its 
finding that the Plaintiff had relied on the State's lack of 
protest and had mined the coal in reliance upon a royalty rate of 
$.15 per ton was wrong. The facts upon which reliance and 
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detriment could correctly be founded were disputed by the 
Defendants. Indeed, the undisputed facts showed that it was the 
State that relied on the Plaintiff to pay the correct royalty 
amount. The Plaintiff had the duty to the State to calculate and 
pay the correct royalty. The State did not have a duty to 
Plaintiff to collect the correct royalty although it has such a 
duty to the school trust. 
If the doctrine of estoppel were applicable in this case the 
Plaintiff must prove: (1) a false representation or concealment 
of a material fact; (2) made with knowledge of the facts; (3) 
made to a party without knowledge or the means of knowledge of 
the real facts; (4) made with the intention that the 
representation be acted upon; and (5) the parties to whom the 
representation was made, relied or acted upon is injured. Colman 
vs. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 at 790 (Utah 1987). 
One is not entitled to rely on erroneous or unauthorized 
statements of a government employee. Dansie vs. Murray City, 560 
P.2d 1123 at 1124 (Utah 1977), Atlantic Richfield vs. Hickel, 
supra at 591. If a person has the means to determine the actual 
facts estoppel does not apply. Morgan vs. Board of State Lands, 
supra. To claim estoppel against the government, the injury must 
be substantial. Paying what is owed under the lease is not an 
injury. Barnes vs. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1988); Williams vs. 
PSC 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988); and Utah Department of 
Transportation vs. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751 P.2d 
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270 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The undisputed facts will not support a finding of estoppel• 
It was the Plaintiff who was responsible to correctly report the 
royalty rate and payments. It was the Plaintiff who had 
substantial dealings with the federal government and who was 
aware of the increase in the federal royalty rate (R.397-399) and 
it was the State that relied on the Plaintiff to accurately 
report and accurately pay the correct royalty amount. (R.433) 
The undisputed facts support a finding of estoppel against the 
Plaintiff and not in favor of the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff claimed that the discussions between the parties 
regarding the lease adjustment and the failure of the State to 
require adjustment in 1981 operated as an estoppel. Adjustment 
of the lease is a separate matter provided for in the recital 
clause of the lease. It has no bearing on the meaning and 
enforcement of Article III which contains the royalty provisions. 
After a hearing on July 8, 1981, the State Land Board ordered 
that certain provisions of the lease be adjusted including 
increasing the royalty rate initially to 4% and after 5 years to 
8%. (R.280) The Land Board, at the request of Plaintiff, agreed 
to delay implementation of the adjustment until the law was 
settled on whether the request for adjustment was timely. 
Plaintiff ceased production in 1983 before those issues were 
finally resolved. These facts do not support estoppel but rather 
show that Plaintiff knew that the royalty rate had increased and 
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that the Land Board felt that Plaintiff should, in fairness to 
the trust, pay a higher royalty rate. 
Plaintiff also claims it would have not have mined the State 
coal lease if the royalty rate had been increased and alleges 
that it will incur a loss if required to pay the increased 
royalty rate. Defendants disputed those allegations. Plaintiff 
listed on its books a royalty of $1.10 per ton while only paying 
the State $.15 ton. (R.400) All costs are passed on by Plaintiff 
to its parent companies and eventually the utilities and 
consumers in the Midwest. Journal of Energy Law, Vol. 8, An 
Economic Analysis of Utility - Coal Company Relationship's 
(1987); In re Indiana and Michigan Electric Company, 40 P.U.R. 
4th 537 (Indiana Public Service Comm. 1981). Also during the 
time period in question, Plaintiff was entering into leases with 
the Federal Government for lands in the same mine complex and was 
paying 8% royalties on those leases. (R.396) Plaintiff will only 
be required to pay what the lease requires. Such does not 
constitute injury. Barnes vs. Wood, supra, Williams vs. PSC, 
supra. If this Court determines that the doctrine of estoppel 
could apply in this case, then the matter should be remanded to 
the trial court for trial with Plaintiff having the burden to 
prove it has met the elements required for estoppel. 
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CONCLUSION 
The law requires that the State of Utah receive a maximum 
return on its disposition of school trust lands. The State 
implemented that requirement by linking the royalty rate on the 
lease to the prevailing federal royalty rate. The decision of 
the trial court imposes improper restrictions on the trust lands. 
The State asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial 
court and remand the case with instructions to enter judgment in 
favor of the State of Utah upholding the decision of the Director 
of State Lands. 
Respectfully submitted this ^0day of July, 1988. 
NIELSEN ST/SENIOR 
Attorneys/for Appellant 
B. AlsLrStf 
T\Y-tt&4uJiUa 
McKeachnie 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLACKHAWK COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH ] 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE ] 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND 
FORESTRY, THE UTAH BOARD OF ) 
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY, THE ) 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN, ] 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL ] 
RESOURCES, ] 
Defendants. ] 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) ON MOTION FOR 
I PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 14943 
The plaintiff has moved the Court for partial 
summary judgment and has supported the same by their Memorandum 
of Legal Points and Authorities, Affidavits and supporting 
documents. The defendants have objected to the Motion and have 
filed their Memorandum of Legal Points and Authorities and 
supporting documents and Affidavits. The Court finds that 
there is no dispute as to the material facts in this case and 
has concluded therefrom that the plaintiff is entitled to 
partial summary judgment as prayed for and grants the 
plaintiff !s Motion. 
The factual situation is nearly identical to the 
fact situation as shown in Carbon Case No. 14890, Plateau 
Mining Company v. The Division of State Lands and Forestry, et a 
and the Court has attached hereto a copy of its opinion in that 
case to show the reasoning of the Court and the legal analysis 
used by the Court in reaching its decision in this case. 
The factual situation in this case is more supportive 
of plaintifffs motion than were the facts in the Plateau Mining 
case in that there was an attempt by the defendants to 
renegotiate the lease in question to a percentage of gross 
value of coal produced in 1981. That attempt was never pursued 
by defendants and even withdrawn in January of 1982. Plaintiff, 
at that time, was informed by John T. Blake, Mineral Resources 
Specialist of the State of Utah, Natural Resources and Energy 
Department, Division of State Lands and Forestry, as follows: 
"Should Blackhawk Coal Company choose to reject my invitation 
for lease adjustment, they may continue to operate under the 
original Lease Agreement until otherwise advised." 
The plaintiff responded in a letter to Mr. Blake on 
January 7, 1982, as follows: "Blackhawk will continue to pay to 
the State, on a quarterly basis, the royalty of $.15 per ton in 
compliance with Article 111(a) of the original Lease Agreement, 
since the provisions of Article 111(b) of this Agreement are 
inapplicable at the present time." 
Thereafter, plaintiff paid and defendant accepted 
without comment or objection the $.15 a ton in accordance with 
Article 111(a) of the Lease. 
2 
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed t 
re a formal judgment in accordance with this decis 
DATED this ^P~/ ^ day of April, 1988. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLATEAU MINING COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation, and 
CYPRUS WESTERN COAL EQUIPMENT 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE ) 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND ] 
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF ] 
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL ] 
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN, ] 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL ] 
RESOURCES, ] 
Defendants. ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) ON MOTIONS FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 14890 
The plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment from 
the Court declaring that the royalty provision contained in the 
State Lease of the defendants is ambiguous and that it should 
be construed in light of the parties course of performance; 
that the lease is not self-executing so as to place a legal 
obligation on plaintiffs to pay a higher rate of royalty after 
the State accepted without qualification the payment of the 
stated rate of $.15 per ton of coal produced; that the 
defendants may not retroactively apply their new policy 
imposing a royalty rate of 8%; that the defendants are estopped 
from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the 
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by plaintiffs and 
accepted by defendants; that the defendants have waived their 
right to demand a higher royalty rate than the one accepted 
during the audit period; and that the ruling of the State 
relative to imposing interest and penalties cannot be legally 
enforced. 
The defendants have objected to the granting of the 
Motion and have submitted their own Motion for Summary Judgment 
asking the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state 
a cause of action; ordering the plaintiff, Plateau Mining 
Company, to pay the delinquent royalty payment as determined on 
the basis of 8% of gross sales value during the audit period; 
ordering that the plaintiff, Plateau Mining Company, owes 
interest on delinquent royalty payments at a rate set by the 
Board of State Lands and, further, ordering that the plaintiff, 
Plateau Mining Company, owes penalties on delinquent royalties 
pursuant to the regulation set by the Board. 
Each of the parties have submitted their Memorandums 
of Legal Points and Authorities and have presented to the Court 
Affidavits and Exhibits which the Court has read and considered 
and the Court heard oral arguments from the parties on February 
16, 1988, and took this matter under advisement and rules on 
the Motions as hereinafter stated. 
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Certain undisputed facts are, for the most part, 
agreed upon by the parties as set forth in their respective 
memorandums, and the Court will not attempt to detail all of 
those undisputed facts. There is no dispute as to the fact 
that the plaintiff, Plateau, and their predecessors in interest 
mined coal under a lease from the State of Utah during the 
period April 1, 1979, to December 31, 1984, referred to as the 
"audit period"; that the Lease was entered into on March 15, 
1965, and that the Lease provides as follows: 
"Article III, Second: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on 
or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, 
royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs of coal 
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise 
disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing at the beginning of the 
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leases of 
land of similar character under coal leases issued by the 
United States at that time, 
whichever is higher. . . ." 
That the lease was on a standard form provided by 
and prepared by the State Land Board, and that throughout the 
audit period the plaintiff, Plateau, or their predecessors in 
interests, filed quarterly with the lessor (State) on a form 
provided by the State a report of the coal mined under the 
Lease and a calculation of the royalty due on the basis of 15C 
per ton. The payment was received and retained by the State 
without question or objection throughout the audit period and 
prior thereto from sometime in 1965. 
The royalty reporting form was provided by the Utah 
Board of State Lands and under the title Royalty Data it has 
two columns. One is headed c/T Basis, and the other is headed 
Percentage Basis. Plateau and their predecessors in interest 
filled in the column entitled c/T Basis and paid the amount of 
royalty shown to be due under that column at 15C per ton and 
left the other column blank. 
After the term of the lease had expired, December 
1984, in approximately February of 1985, the State undertook, 
for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments. The 
audit was completed on or about May 29, 1985, and a demand was 
sent to the plaintiffs for delinquent royalties in October of 
1985. 
It was the conclusion of the audit that the federal 
government, during the audit period, was imposing a royalty on 
coal leases of 8% of the value of the coal removed. Based upon 
the audit, the State made a demand upon the plaintiffs for the 
payment of an additional $2,991,613.44 for delinquent 
royalties, interest and penalties based upon 8% of Gross Sales 
Value of coal removed. 
Based upon an examination of the Lease and the 
parties attempts to comply with its terms, and particularly the 
expressed attitude of the various individuals whose 
responsibility it was to enforce the Lease for and on behalf of 
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the State, the Court finds that as a matter of law the royalty 
provision as contained in Article III, paragraph Second (b) of 
the lease is ambiguous. 
The royalty provision is divided into two parts. 
Part (a) is definite and precise and is capable of definitive 
determination and provides for 15C per ton on coal produced 
from the leased premises. 
Part (b) leaves the amount due based on several 
factors not immediately capable of definitive determination. 
The ambiguity arises as much from what is not stated and 
provided as from what is stated. In other words, at the 
beginning of the reporting quarter what is the prevailing 
federal rate and who makes that determination, the lessor or 
the lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a 
determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is 
it prevalent? Who makes the determination that the land in the 
State Lease and the land in the Federal Lease are similar in 
character and what is the basis for determining similarity? 
V/hat time period is used to determine federal leases "issued... 
at that time" and who makes that determination? Even if a 
prevailing federal rate is established, does it apply to .the 
"value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal regulation 
or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State auditor in 
his assessment, and who makes that determination? 
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For these reasons, the Court has concluded that 
sub-paragraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal 
obligation on the lessee since the identifiable factors 
necessary for self-execution could not independently be 
ascertained by either party. 
Sub-paragraph (b) was written by the State for its 
benefit and since it is not self-executing, it v/ould require 
some affirmitive action on their part to bring the provision of 
that sub-paragraph into an enforceable position other than a 
retroactive audit after having accepted the provisions of 
sub-paragraph (a) without objection or comment. 
Under these circumstances, the Court must look to 
the prior conduct of the lessor and the lessees under the Lease 
over a period of years that show that they chose to ingnore the 
provisions of sub-paragraph (b), and to calculate the royalty 
under sub-paragraph (a). 
Since the State by an established course of conduct 
for many years adopted a construction of the Lease that 
provided for 15c a ton, they are now precluded from asserting a 
different construction of the Lease where they took no 
sufficient or positive action to establish their now asserted 
construction to an ambiguous lease provision. 
Because of the above legal conclusion, it would not 
be necessary for the Court to go further, but as a further 
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ground for what the Court's final conclusion and ruling will 
be, the Court will address other issues presented. 
The Court is of the opinion that regardless of 
whether the status of the land is School Trust Land or not, the 
State acts in its proprietary capacity when it enters into a 
contractual lease that is authorized under law and that the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the State 
and its Land Board as any other contracting individual. 
The Court has concluded as a matter of law that the 
State is estopped from demanding payment of royalty based upon 
the 8% of value figure. The undisputed facts show that the 
State was aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of 
Article III of their own Lease and were made aware by the 
quarterly payments submitted by Plateau and its predecessors in 
interest that those provisions were being ignored by leaving 
that reporting column blank and by accepting, throughout the 
auditing period, without question or objection, royalty based 
upon 15C a ton. If the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) were 
going to be used, the State had a duty to speak which they did 
not do. By their conduct and failure to perform this duty, 
they induced plaintiffs to believe that 15c a ton was the 
acceptable ro.yalty and plaintiffs, in reliance thereon, 
continued to mine coal under the Lease which they would not 
have done had they known that the defendants were going to 
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insist upon the 8% of value provision. The great injustice 
that would result to plaintiffs if we now allow the defendants 
to assert this position, is quite obvious since the record 
shows that to allow the imposition of the greater royalty, the 
plaintiffs would show a substantial loss on all mining activity 
under the State Lease. 
Even if the conclusion is reached that the defendants 
were acting in a governmental capacity, they would still be 
estopped from asserting the new royalty rate. No substantial 
adverse effect on public policy will result if the defendants 
are estopped from applying this newly determined royalty 
retroactively. The State can still proceed to lease coal lands 
on any terms it feels profitable and that will give the State 
the maximum return. They still have the power to revise the 
wording of their coal leases to do away with any ambiguity and 
to carry out any legally established policy. 
Further, the record shows that the plaintiffs would 
not have entered into certain stock purchases and transfers on 
the terms that were then agreed to had they known of the 
State1s position and the contemplated change in the royalty 
provision as previously accepted, and that the plaintiffs would 
suffer at this time great economic loss as a result. 
The Court further finds that the State had no right 
under the Lease to impose interest, except on delinquent 
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payments at the legal rate, or any penalty. A legally binding 
lease cannot be altered or added to by by rules and regulations 
adopted subsequently. 
The Lease does state that it is subject to such 
operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved 
and adopted. Such a provision could not be interpreted to mean 
changes to or additions of monetary payment. "Operating Rules" 
has reference to method of mining and can have no other logical 
interpretation. Since the amount claimed by the State is not 
subject to definitive determination, any interest that may be 
due could not commence to run until demand is made. 
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants 
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prayed for 
and denies defendants1 iMotion for Summary Judgment. 
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to 
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion. 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
,C-O^^z^ 
BOYD ) BtfNNELL, D j 3 s t r i c t Judge 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
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BLACKHAWK COAL COMPANY, 
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v. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH 
MILES, Director of the 
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RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN, 
Executive Director of the Utah 
Department of Natural 
Resources, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff has filed its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, together with its Supporting Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities; Defendants have filed their Memorandum in 
SEVEKTH DISTRICT CCURT 
CAWiCH COUNTY. UTAH 
FILED 
HAY !! ISE3 
HCRKAHrRICHARD. CLERK 
BYZ^l i^Vrrvv£a8-> 
DLFUM' 
* 
* JUDGMENT 
* 
it 
* C i v i l No. 14943 
* 
* 
* 
2 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion. Plaintiff is represented by 
Hugh C. Garner; Defendants are represented by their counsel Gayle 
F. McKeachnie and Clark B. Allred. The court having considered 
the memoranda and exhibits submitted by the parties and having 
previously, on April 21, 1988f issued its Memorandum Decision on 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
NOW THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff owes no royalties, penalties or interest 
to Defendants on State of Utah coal lease No. ML-18148 as 
demanded in Defendants' October 15, 1985 Royalty Audit Report. 
2. The judgment signed by this court in this case is a 
final order and judgment from which an appeal may proceed. 
3. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys1 
fees in connection with this case. 
DATED this //~ daY of«*£**^ 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
BOYD BUNNELL 
istrict—Court Judg^z 
3 
The above judgment was prepared by Hugh C. Garner of 
and for Hugh C. Garner & Associates, P.C., attorney for 
Plaintiff, and was, prior to execution by the court and pursuant 
to Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit 
Courts of the State of Utah, submitted to the following on this 
26th day of April, 1988. 
David L. Wilkinson, Esq. 
David S. Christensen, Esq. 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Gayle F. McKeachnie, Esq. 
Clark B. Allred, Esq. 
Nielsen & Senior 
363 East Main Street 
Vernkl, Utah 84078 
MINERAL LEASE APPLICATION MINERAL LEASH NO. L ^ A:-'* .P__ 
>i,,:rA'n'M'..,.;H;.v1;,-)«.;,;.,-,,.i.,)l.:",-. i ,v; ».• .,-• (•.:••••;• G R A N T : S c h o o l .* . •• •• . - '. * • •; c 
l / fa/ i Sicile Lease for 
COAL 
THIS INDENTURE OF ! EASE AND AGREEMENT entered Into in duplicate this l t t b l l . . day of E^nV^^y. , 19.J.M 
by and between the STA'l E LAND BOARD, acting in hoiialf of the Stnte of Utah, hereinafter cnlled the Lessor, and 
CARTON DEra.ornFirr canrMir 
I \ 0. Dox 506 
Holp *r, Utah 
party of the second part, hcieinafter cnlled the Lessee, under and Pursuant to Title 65, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
WITNESSETH: That the Lessor, in consideration of the rents and royalties to be paid and the covenants to he observed by the Les'ee, ns here-
inafter set forth, does licrcby Riant and lease to the Lessee the exclusive tight nnd privilege to mine, remove, nnd dispose of nil of the 
said minerals in, upon, or under the following described tract of land situated in vf\XDOIl County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
AH of Section Thirty-bwo (32), Tcvmship Twalva (12) South, Hans'? r 1^^ (?) East, 
Salt Laic* Mori/Jinn, 
containing a tota acres, more or Ic-s, togcdier with the right to use nnd occupy so much of the surface of said land as 
liiav be required for all purposes reasonably incidmr to the mining, removal, and di'posal of said minerals, according to the provisions of this 
lease, for the period ending ten yraK aft»-r the first day of Januaiy next succeeding the date heteof and as long thereafter as said minerals may 
be produced in commercial quantities from said land'-, or Lessee shall continue to make the payments requited by Article III hereof, upon 
condition that nt the end of each twenty (20) year period succeeding the first day of the year in which this lease, is issued, such readjustment 
of terms and conditions may be made as the Lessor may dctctrninc to he necessary in the interest of the State. 
ARTICLE I 
"Ibis lease is Granted subject in all respects to and under the conditions of the laws of the State of Utah and existing rules and regulations 
nnd such operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State Land Board. 
ARTICLE U 
This lease covers only the mininp, removal, and di p-sal of the minerals specified in this lease, but the Lessee shall promptly notify the 
tlir Lessor of the discovery of any minerals excepting those enumerated herein. 
ARTICLE III 
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting of the rights nnd ptivileges aforesaid, hereby covenants and agiees as follows: 
FIRST: To pay to the Lessor as rental for the land covered by this lease the sum of fifty (50) cents per acre per annum. All such annual 
payments of rental shall be made in advance <M\ the 2nd day of January of •. h y a r , e x e p t the '.'.. rental which is payable 
on the execution of this lease. All rentals shall be credited against royalties for the year in which they accrue. 
SECOND: To pay to Lessor quaiterly, v\\ or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty 
(n) nt the rate of 15f* per (on of 2CC0 lbs. of coal produced fiom the leased premises and othctwise disposed cf, or 
(b) at the rate, ptevailing, at the beginning of the quarter for which payment is being made, fur federal lessees of land of similar char-
acter tinder coal leases issued by the United States at that time, 
whichever is higher, nnd, commencing with the year beginning the January 1 following two ycats from the date hereof, to pay annual lov-ilty 
of nt lc:>st S1.C0 multiplied by tli- number of acres hereby leased regardless of actual production, provided that Lessor may, nt any time after 
the tenth Anniversary date hereof, increase the minimum annual royalty by not to exceed 50Co. 
" Appendix 1 " 
y 
TJIIIU': To pirpntc and forward to the State l aud Office, on or before the I5ih day of the month next succeeding the quarter in which 
the mntetial is produced, a certified statement of the amount of production of all of the leased substances disposed of from said lands, nnd 
such other additional information ns the State Land Hoard may from time to time require. 
LOUR i l l : To keep at the nunc office clear, accurate arid detailed maps en tracing cloth, en a scale n^t mote than 50 feet to the inch, 
of the woikingn in each section of the leasrd lands and on the lauds adjacent, said maps to be coordinated with reference to a public land cor- ! 
ner eo that th-y can be readily nnd correctly supeiimporcd, nnd to furnish to the Lessor annually, or upon demand, certified copies of such j 
maps nnd such written statements of operations as may be called for. All surveys shall be made by rt licensed engineer nnd all maps certified • 
to by him. j^  
r i F I I I : Mot to fence or otherwise male in:"-r^"ilr. to stock any water inn [dace on the premises without first obtaining the written consent 
of Lessor, nor to permit or contribute to the pollution of any surface or subsurface water available or capable of being made available for domestic 
or irrigation use. 
SIX 111: Not to assign this lea-^ e or any interest therein, nor sublet any portion of the leased premises, or any of the rights and privileges 
herein granted, without the written consent of the Lessor being first had and obtained. 
ARTICLE IV 
l i r e Lessor hereby excepts and reserves from the operation of this lease: 
MRST: The right to permit for joint or several u-e such easements or rights of-way upon, through, or in the land hereby leased rs rnny 
be necessary or nppropiinte to the working of these or other lands belonging to or administered by the Lessor containing mineral deposits 
or for other use. 
SECOMU: The rifdit to use, lease, sell, or otherwise d i s u s e of the surface of fiaid lands or nny part thereof, tinder existing State laws 
or laws hereafter enacted, insofar ns said surface is not necessnry for the Lcsce in the nu'ninp, removal, or disposal of the leased substances there-
in, and to lease mineral deposits, other than those lease I hereby, which may be contained in said lands so long as the recovery of such de-
posits does not unreasonably interfere with Lessee's rights herein granted. 
ARTICLE V 
Upon failure or refuel of the Lesser to accept the readjustment of terms and conditions demanded by the Lessor nt the end of nny twenty-
year period, such failure or refusal shall wotk n forfeiture of the lease nnd the same shall be canceled. 
ARTICLE VI 
In ensr of expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of this lease, all utid'-r ground timbering "supports, shaft linings, rails nod 
other installation-. necersaiy for the support of undeii:roimd wordings of nny mines, and all rails or head frames and all installations which 
cannot be innovcd without permanent injury to th- j*trnit-;'"^ and nil construct!' n and equipment installed underground to provide ventilation 
for any mines, upon 01 in the said lands shall be and remain a part of the tcalty and shall revert to the Lessor withorit further consideration or 
compensation. :.nd shall be lrlt by the Lessee in the lands. 
All personal property of Lessee located within or upon the said l.-nds, and all buildings, machinery, equipment and toota (otlier thru the 
Installations to become the property of Lessor as alcove ptovided), shall be anil remain the property of Lessee and Lessee shall be entitled to, 
nnd may, within six (o) months after such expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of raid lease, or within such extension of 
time as may be gtanterl bv Lessor, remove from the snjd lands such personnl property and improvements, other than those items which are 
to remain die property of the Lessor ns above provided. 
Le.s-.ee shall, upon termination, of this Iras- or aban hutment of the leased premise for any reason, seal to Lessor's satisfaction all or such 
part of the mine openings on the premises ns Lessor shall request be scaled. 
ARTICLE VII 
It shall be the rc-ponsibility of the Lessee to slope the sides of nil operations of n sutfnee nature to an angle of riot less than 45" or to 
erect a barrier around such operation as the State Land l'oard may require. Such "'oping or fencing shall become a normal part of the opera-
tion of the lense so ns to keep pace with such operation to the extent that such operation shnll not constitute a hazard. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Lessee shall not sell or otherwise dispose of nny water rights acquired for use upon the leased premises except with Lessor's written per-
infssron. Upon termination of this leas? (or any reason, all such rights acquired by application to the L'tnh State Engineer shnll revert to the 
Lessor ns nn nppurtenance to the leased premises, nnd nil «uch rights acquired by other mean.i shall be offered to Lessor in writing for purchase 
nt Lessee's acquisition cv^^, provided that Lessor shall he deemed to have rejected such offer if it does not accept the same within thirty 
days nfter receipt thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
AH of the terms, covenants, conditions, and obligations in this lease contained, shall be binding uj-njn the heirs, executors, administrators, 
and assigns of the Lessee. 
ARTICLE X 
Lessee rnny terminate this lease at any time u p n gb-'im? three (3) months' notice in writing to the Lessor nnd upon payment of all 
rents and royalti-s nnd other sums due and payable to th" Lessor, and upon complying with the terms of this lease with respect to the preser-
vation of the workings in such order nnd condition ns to permit of the continued operation of the leased premises. 
ARTICLE XI 
Lessor, its officers and agents, shall hnve the right nt all times to go in and upon the leased lands nnd premises, during the term of said 
lease to inspect the work done nnd the progress thereof on said lands nnd the products obtained therefrom, nnd to post any notices on the 
said land that it may deem fit and ptoper; and also shall permit any authorized representatives of the lessor to examine nil books nnd records 
P^rtnininj? to operations under this lease, and to make copies of and extracts from the lame, If desired. 
ARTICLE Xll 
(^  
^ ^ 1 ^ > L ^ ^ 
CARBON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a 
C O P - Q O r a t i o n ^ _ , "**^—. 
P r e s i d e n t . LESSE; 
STATE OF UTAH 1 
\ SS. LESSEE'S INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
COUNT; OF 1 
On the day of 19 , personally appeared before me 
the signer of the above instrument, who duiy acknowledged to me that _ executed the same. 
Given under my hand and seal this day of 19 
My commission Expires: "Notary Public, residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CARBON 
On the 19M day of \kL9jL 
LESSEE'S CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
J-\u)er, J . Diarnnnt i 19...™., personally appeared before me 
who being duly sworn did say that he is an officer of ...C.ar.?ao.n...I).e..Y.elaprie.n.t....C..Qmp.n,J.t)X and that said instrument was signed 
Jorn?s J . ^ i aman t i in behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Board of Directors, and said 
edged to me that snid corporation executed the same. 
cknov. 
Given under my hand and seal this day of 
My commission Expires: 
2 / 9 / 6 0 
M.i re h i9.i°. 
Notary Public, residing at: H e l p e r , U t a h 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
] , . 
On the tr.-.:.:.-.."! day of ...... 19...':..„, personally appeared before me Frank J. Allen, who beinp by me dul 
say that he is the Director of the State Lnnd lioard of the State of Utah and that said instrument was siened in behalf of said Board by 
tion of the Board, and snid Fiank j . Allen acknowledged to me thnt snid Bonrd executed the fame in behalf of the State of Utah. 
y sworn ma 
rcsoiu-
Given under my hand and seal this .!. day of /.'. .!- „.L... 19 —. 
' V J^^aJ ^> ,f 
My commission Expires: vs" /y''/c^ J l - Nouiry Public, residing at: 
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